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ABSTRACT 
 
 Tremendous amount of oil and gas products are transported in pipeline 
worldwide giving rise to a demand to identify the hazards and evaluate the associated 
risk. Third-party intrusion is usually one of the least factors being considered during the 
pipeline hazard assessment stage despite the substantial portion contributing to the total 
number of oil and gas pipeline incident. This is because of the probabilistic risk 
assessment defect that makes it hard to model human actions and cannot be applied to 
intentional acts. Due to the distinctive motivations of third-party damage, an 
unintentional third-party damage Bayesian Network model and a game-theoretic model 
on malicious intrusion will therefore be built, respectively to examine the mechanism of 
pipeline failure caused by this mode.    
 This study is conducted aiming at investigating pipeline risk resulting from third-
party damage, and will formulate risk assessment models to identify threats, prioritize 
risks and determine which integrity plan should apply to different pipeline segments 
given the condition of third-party interference (both the accidental damage and malicious 
acts). In other words, it can help to anticipate an optimal planning of the in-line 
inspection intervals which can decrease the risk of the pipeline to an acceptable level and 
achieve cost-effective pipeline integrity management.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 Within the energy industry, the primary marketing distribution of products 
include a multitude of forms such as crude oil, lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, 
dry natural gas, coal, hydroelectric, nuclear, geothermal, solar, wind, wood and waste 
electric power that increased from 245 quadrillion BTU in 1973 to 518 BTU in 2011 
with approximate 2 percent annual growth rate [2]. In the entire energy world, oil and 
gas industry is so tangible that has significant impact on our lives in many ways. More 
than sixty percent of energy in U.S. was supplied by oil or natural gas, which fuel 
vehicles and planes, heat the residential houses and provide raw materials to fine 
chemicals (downstream) industry by the process like cracking. The production of crude 
oil in U.S. had a dramatic growth in the period of 1920’s to 1980’s while the boom of 
natural gas started decades later in 1950’s and a second boom occurred in the past three 
decades as shown in the Figure 1 and 2 [3]. The high demand and consumption of oil 
and gas reveals its important status in economics and business. Thus, the maintenance of 
this industry in the current configuration becomes a vital issue for many nations.  
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Figure 1. U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil (source: U.S. Energy Administration)[3]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. Natural Gas Production (source: U.S. Energy Administration)[4]. 
  
 
Thousand	Barrels	per	day	
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 One of the essential elements composed of oil and gas industry is the pipeline 
system. Tremendous pipelines across the country had built a vast and efficient network 
in natural gas transportation with regards to three different working functions: gathering, 
distribution and transmission. The first two types of pipelines represent the beginning 
and the end of gas supply chain system. Like the vessels that transport the blood 
throughout human body, pipelines connect oil fields both onshore and offshore to 
refineries and petrochemical facilities carrying oil and gas feedstocks, and deliver these 
products to consumers and businesses over the country. This massive oil and gas 
delivering network consists of more than 200,000 miles of liquid petroleum pipelines 
and over 2,500,000 miles of natural gas pipeline in U.S. reported by Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) [5]. As shown in Table 1 and 2, 
both liquid and gas pipelines have a stable increase in number of pipeline length during 
the recent five years, indicating a steady development and promising future in using 
pipeline.  
 Compared with other transportation methods such as train or highway to deliver 
hazardous materials, pipelines have a number of advantages including relatively being 
safer and higher efficiency due to the nature of pipeline which operates 24/7 without 
many constrains. Because of this, the use of pipeline is increasingly prevalent in carrying 
hazardous materials nowadays over other transmission approaches.  
 However, with such large number of pipelines, the safety problem should also be 
taken into consideration seriously as the rupture in pipeline could bring catastrophic 
consequence involving injury, fatality, loss of revenue and irreversible environmental 
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damage. The latest pipeline incident data demonstrated that in 2015, 708 pipeline 
incidents occurred with about 100,000 Barrels spilled in the United States. The total 
direct economic losses reached $339 Million. 12 people were killed due to the hazards 
from pipeline and 49 people got injured.  
 
 
Table 1. Number of U.S liquid pipeline miles by system type in 2011-2015 (Portal Data as of 
8/31/2016) *The total miles of U.S pipeline (liquid) also include biofuel, CO2 and others by 
commodity[5]. 
 
Miles of U.S Pipeline 
(Liquid) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Crude Oil   56,100   57,463   61,087   66,813   72,440  
Refined Products  64,130   64,042   63,351   61,767   62,555  
Natural Gas Liquids (NGL)  64,130   64,042   63,351   61,767   62,555  
Total*  183,580   186,221   192,417   199,703   207,806  
 
 
 
Table 2. Number of U.S gas pipeline miles by system type in 2011-2015 (Portal Data as of 
8/31/2016)[5]. 
 
Miles of U.S Pipeline 
(Gas) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gas Distribution  2,121,051   2,138,001   2,149,598   2,169,155   2,190,549  
Gas Gathering  19,277   16,532   17,369   17,509   17,712  
Gas Transmission  305,057   303,341   302,827   301,804   301,060  
Total  2,445,385   2,457,873   2,469,793   2,488,468   2,509,321  
 
 
 
 Incidents like Qingdao Sinopec explosion in China showed how devastating the 
outcome could be in terms of pipeline failure and disclosed many safety problems in 
pipeline management as well, which can be further learned to prevent similar tragedies. 
The past incidents and near misses are precious textbooks that can reflect different 
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aspects of problematic attributes. In fact, many process safety incidents (pipeline 
incidents) mostly share similar root causes, therefore, putting considerable attention and 
efforts to get lessons learned is extremely worthwhile. For this reason, one of the 
representative pipeline incidents will be briefly discussed to deduct some core causes 
that will be analyzed in detail later in this manuscript.  
 On November 22, 2013, a crude oil pipeline suddenly exploded in Qingdao, 
ripping roads and sidewalks apart, turning cars over and sending thick black smoke over 
the city. The disastrous blast killed 62 people and injured 136 as one of the deadliest 
vapor cloud explosions in china. The incident led to the stop in electricity and water in 
nearby areas. About 18,000 people were then evacuated.  
 The ignition of crude oil produced by a corroded underground pipeline was the 
direct cause of the vapor cloud explosion. Workers were using a hydraulic hammer that 
wasn’t explosion-proof, which generated sparks that triggered the blast. Two months 
later, Sinopec released the official investigation report and pointed out that the pipeline 
corrosion and human error were the two main causes accounting for this incident.  
 In addition to the two major causes, several underlying facets also projected the 
occurrence of the incident. The corrosion of the pipeline that was carrying crude oil was 
not inevitable. Since 2009, Sinopec pipe storage and transportation branch had 
conducted three anti-corrosive performance tests, none of the tests did detect the 
corrosion or potential failure [6]. The negligence of pipeline supervision was exposed in 
this incident. Carrying out periodic maintenance and careful inspection can dramatically 
reduce the probability of pipeline rupture, which Sinopec failed to do so. Especially, in 
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this case, the pipelines were buried in a densely populated area that should be treated as 
high consequence areas (HCA). In the United States, since 2004, all operators of gas 
transmission pipelines located in the defined high consequence areas have been subject 
to PHMSA’s gas integrity management (IM) program requirements [7]. Similar 
regulations and socio-organizational management are very worthwhile to learn and to be 
implemented.  
 The city’s municipal design born the responsibility as well. The extent of 
corrosion within this pipeline segment was so severe that the pipeline life was actually 
shorted by about 30 years as the initially designed running span was 70 years. This is 
largely because the crude oil pipeline intertwined with sewage drains that directly 
connected with the Yellow Sea of China [6]. It is not hard to imagine that the long-term 
corrosion by sea water introduced by drain system would fail the pipeline at some point. 
Obviously, the improper design negatively influenced the pipeline inspection and 
maintenance and also accelerate the corrosion rate. More seriously, Sinopec did not even 
get informed of the unreasonable underground utility layout, making it almost 
impossible to do any management of change (MOC) and planning regarding the design 
defect.  
 Besides, the pipeline also experienced frequent traffic-induced vibration which 
greatly jeopardized the structural integrity, and thus increased the probability of pipeline 
failure. Once pipeline leaks, the flammable liquid contained in the line could volatile, 
easily forming a flammable gas phase and all needed is just an ignition source to 
generate an explosion.  
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 The escalation of the event was not only due to the dense population but also the 
inadequate emergency response. Considered as the last defense of protection when 
encountering a process safety incident, emergency planning was so insufficient in this 
case that the risk of vapor cloud explosion was never covered in the Sinopec safety 
program. Apart from that, there is no immediate action like evacuation from the 
dangerous zone. Sadly, most of the fatalities were the pipeline repairing crew.  
 Many incidents are preventable or can be mitigated to some extent if safety 
culture is well-cultivated across virtually all levels of an organization [8]. The lack of 
safety awareness will destroy every layer of protection and facilitate a doomed disaster.    
 In order to prevent process safety incidents and mitigate the consequences, the 
hazards should be fully identified, analyzed and assessed beforehand with various 
applicable methodologies. Based on the PHMSA pipeline incident database, seven major 
causes resulting in pipeline incidents are summarized as below [9]: 
1. Corrosion failure (Internal and external corrosion threat) 
2. Equipment failure (Equipment threat) 
3. Incorrect operation (Incorrect operations threat)   
4. Third-party damage (Third-party excavation threat) 
5. Material failure of pipe or weld (Manufacturing, construction, or stress cracking 
threat)   
6. Natural force damage (Weather-related/outside forces threat) 
7. Other causes   
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 On the basis of the given major cause categories, the statistics about the number 
and percentage of pipeline incidents (2011-2015) are listed in Tables 3 and 4. 
Furthermore, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the incident counts and percentage distribution by 
failure cause classification, respectively. As observed from the analyzed data, equipment 
failure, corrosion, and third-party damage now are becoming the three leading causes 
weighing 32%, 18% and 15% in the number of pipeline incidents in the past five years.  
 
 
Table 3. Number of pipeline incidents by causes from 2011 to 2015 in the United States. 
Data source: [5] 
 
No. of Pipeline Incidents 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Total 592 573 619 701 708 3193 
Corrosion 108 133 97 109 121 568 
Equipment Failure 170 176 216 240 212 1014 
Incorrect Operations 68 77 99 104 79 427 
Third-Party Damage 105 85 98 95 100 483 
Materials & Welds Failure 67 53 58 75 99 352 
Natural Forces 40 24 26 44 47 181 
Others 34 25 25 34 50 168 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative pipeline incident counts by causes from 2011 to 2015. 
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Table 4. Percentage of pipeline incidents by causes from 2011 to 2015 in the United State. 
 
Weighing % in Pipeline 
Incidents 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Corrosion 18% 23% 16% 16% 17% 18% 
Equipment Failure 29% 31% 35% 34% 30% 32% 
Incorrect Operations 11% 13% 16% 15% 11% 13% 
Third-Party Damage 18% 15% 16% 14% 14% 15% 
Materials & Welds Failure 11% 9% 9% 11% 14% 11% 
Natural Forces 7% 4% 4% 6% 7% 6% 
Others 6% 4% 4% 5% 7% 5% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage distribution of pipeline incidents by failure mode classification (2011-
2015). 
 
 
 
 Having clearly identified the core causes leading to pipeline incidents, the next 
step is to establish pipeline risk models using some risk assessment tools. Risk is widely 
known as a product of failure frequency and the magnitude of undesirable consequences. 
Conducting a risk assessment is very essential and helpful to prevent adverse incidents 
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during an industrial process when dealing with hazardous materials [10, 11]. Hence, a 
good and reliable risk assessment is expected to enable safety personnel to manipulate 
the threats and reduce the outcome as low as reasonably practical (ALARP). Three 
conventional and commonly used pipeline risk assessment approaches are presented here. 
 Risk matrix is basically a two-dimensional (sometimes is three-dimensional 
depending on different analysis scenarios) table with columns containing levels of 
failure probability and rows involving possible scales of consequence severity, or vice 
versa. By synthesizing the two risk elements, a risk matrix can stratify the threats with 
the given specific criteria from previous experience and expert knowledge. The 
resolution of a risk matrix can be improved by increasing the number of cells in the table 
and is determined by the need for precision. It is one of the simplest techniques to 
measure the overall risk and is very easy to understand and apply [12] with intuitive 
graphical expression. However, this approach lacks of meticulous classification of risk 
index [13], therefore, cannot handle complex scenarios when demanded. 
 First used to control the intercontinental missile in 1962 by Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, fault tree analysis is now one of the most extensively used methods in 
performing safety studies and testing system reliability [14]. The fundamental idea of a 
fault tree analysis is to quantitatively evaluate a physical system through a well-built 
comprehensive diagram implying possible fault attributes and paths. Typically, a fault 
tree analysis undergoes four steps: system definition, fault tree construction (set a logic 
diagram through basic elements towards the top event), qualitative assessment and 
quantitative calculation [15]. An example of fault tree diagram is given by Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. An example of a fault tree diagram [14]. (a) Fault tree diagram, where symbol G2 
represents AND gate, G1 and G3 represent OR gates and M1-M4 represent basic-fault 
events. (b) minimal cutsets generation.  
 
 
 
 The quantitative risk assessment (QRA) can be derived from the fault tree or 
event tree techniques with accumulated historical data and statistics, formulating 
rigorous calculation of probabilities and other numerical risk parameters. The risk 
assessment by using QRA methodology is now popular among diverse facilities 
including large chemical plants and nuclear reactors [16, 17].  
 Indexing risk assessment, known as point scoring system is essentially a widely 
used technique in the industry to evaluate the performance of pipeline segments by 
means of adding the scores of assorted variables that related to the pipeline conditions. 
The assigned numerical values for each variable can either be a risk-increasing item or 
risk-reducing item [17], while weighting factors associated with each variable reflect its 
significance judged by engineering experience. These variables contributing to depict 
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pipeline segment activities concern lots of issues including pipeline design, internal or 
external corrosion, ground or environment condition, etc. [18]. In practice, the global 
index for each pipeline segment can be obtained by summing up points from each item 
and multiplying different weighting factors. Having achieved the point values of 
examined pipeline segments, the safety crew will be more confident in prioritizing future 
inspection, repair, and many other risk management efforts through the ranking of 
scored values.   
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 In order to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequence of a pipeline incident, it 
is critical to familiarize the characteristics of each pipeline hazard category. Knowing the 
feature of each threat type is conducive to properly choose methods and models for 
further studies. Table 5 exhibits the classification of pipeline threat types [1] and 
description defined by ASME 2012c. However, it should be noted that the threats are 
hard to be strictly classified due to the nature of the hazards, so there exists some 
overlapping for those threat categories. For example, earth movement like other natural 
forces remains highly unpredictable and is listed as time-independent hazards. On the 
other hand, this arrangement seems to contradict the fact that earth does move as the 
time goes. However, the reason to treat it as a time-independent hazard is primarily due 
to the stability and randomness from a long-term perspective, though there is no such 
clear boundary for this case.     
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 Currently, studies of risk assessment on oil and gas pipelines (considered 
comprehensive aspects of hazard sources) have been widely conducted by a quantity of 
research groups because of the significant impact on pipeline safety and security [19-30]. 
 Some quantitative risk assessment (QRA) approaches have been applied to 
measure the risks in oil and gas piping. Jo [19] developed a simplified consequence-
based analysis by incorporating parameters of fatal length and cumulative fatal length to 
investigate two popular risks namely, individual risk (IR) and societal risk (SR). In this 
paper, the fatal length by definition is the distance having an integrated fatality along the 
pipeline where an incident occurs, while the cumulative fatal length is the distance 
Table 5. Classifications of pipeline threat types [1] and associated threats. 
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having N or more fatalities. The consequence analysis exploring thermal effect and gas 
release rate was eventually converted to solving the fatal length and the cumulative fatal 
length. As a result, the individual risk or societal risk can be achieved by combining the 
fatal length or cumulative fatal length with the data of pipeline failure probabilities as 
shown in Figure 6(a) and (b). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. (a) Individual risk as a function of the length from gas supply station. (b) F-N 
societal risk curve [19].   
 
 
 
 This novel method can reduce the complication of quantitative risk assessment 
by shifting the difficulty of evaluating consequences to calculating fatal length and 
cumulative fatal length which can be easily estimated by using geographic information 
systems (GIS). Nonetheless, this approach only considered the consequence of fatality 
regardless of economic loss or environmental loss. In addition, other physical effects 
cannot be ignored, because in more practical scenarios, factors like toxicity, 
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overpressure, and explosion are indispensable in the process of consequence 
investigation.  
 Similar quantitative risk assessment approaches have been improved in the study 
carried out by Han [20, 21] and Gharabagh [22] where diverse influential consequence 
models are incorporated considering various real-case scenarios. But the lack of 
historical data and structural reliability analysis still seriously constrain the prediction 
precision.  
 On the other side, qualitative risk assessment also catches considerable attention 
to fundamentally clarify the failure mechanism of a pipeline segment by implementing 
fault tree analysis where the failure modes are degraded to corrosion, errors in 
construction, design factors and external hazards in Dziubinski’s study [23] as observed 
in Figure 7 and degraded to interference from third party, corrosion, defects of pipe, 
incorrect operation, unreasonable design and geological hazard in Dong’s study [24]. 
But now, a complete risk assessment is much preferred with more quantified data 
combined in the model. 
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Figure 7. Fault tree analysis for pipeline failure [23]. 
 
 
 
 Among the existing methods of pipeline risk assessment, Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) is a risk-based model that allows more interactive participation of 
decision-makers and executives with many years operating experience to examine 
pipeline problems. Great emphasis has been placed on this empirical method [25-27] 
industrial-wide since it involves more practical inputs and is flexible and easily 
understood. The principle of AHP is firstly formulating a structural framework by 
hierarchy, and then listing the level of goal, main risk attributes, sub-attributes and a few 
pipeline segments which align with their natural stretch. Once the skeleton is formed 
(shown in Figure 8), comparisons will be made for each pair of pipeline segments in 
terms of risk attributes and sub-attributes (assigning credits) to determine the likelihood 
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of failure (normalizing the credit), while the severity of failure is then decided by a 
Monte Carlo simulation [25]. The results of likelihood and severity for each pipeline 
segment with regards to various risk factors are elaborated in Table 6. Consequently, the 
ranking based on assessment provides a powerful reference for decision-makers to adopt 
a suitable plan for the pipeline inspection and maintenance.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Framework of AHP on pipeline risk assessment with five different pipeline 
stretches [25]. 
 
 
 
 As a matter of fact, representatives who work on the pipeline risk analysis could 
be buried in the plenty information from pipeline database and numerous contributing 
factors, which may negatively affect the judgement for pipeline condition and the 
probability of failure. Therefore, the limitations of this technique lie in the subjective 
thoughts which can substantially undermine the effectiveness of this model. 
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Table 6. Likelihood and severity of each pipeline segment by various risk factors [25]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Other advanced risk assessment tools such as fuzzy logic interference systems 
[28, 29] and indexing risk models [30] are also used to monitor pipeline safety and have 
achieved notable success.  
 But more detailed concerns and discussions on some of the leading causes 
especially the third-party damage were much less reported in the literature compared 
with other causes like corrosion [31-36]. The third-party involvement is the third core 
cause followed by equipment failure and corrosion, weighting 15% in the incident 
reports during the past five years recorded by U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 
as indicated in Figure 4 [5]. This kind of external interference composed of accidental 
activities and malicious sabotage or pilferage contributes as high as 75% to the total 
individual risk [19, 25]. Moreover, the deliberate intent of pipeline damage is more 
common and rampant in the socioeconomically deprived regions. In some undeveloped 
areas of China, many oil transmission pipelines are drill by oil stealer for profit each 
year. For instance, it is documented that 6743 holes were drilled on the pipeline of 
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Changqing oilfield in 2000 along with the loss of 13,000-ton oil and approximate 15.43 
million in U.S. Dollars. The 655.37 km-long Luning pipeline had 227 holes during 1999 
to 2003 [37]. Figure 9 displayed a 5m-long drilled pipeline segment with 9 holes. 
Similarly, data showed that vandalism ranked as the top one cause that challenged the 
pipeline safety in Nigeria [38]. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. 5m-long drilled pipeline segment with 9 holes [37]. 
 
 
 
 The fact that both the accidental third-party excavation and intentional sabotage 
can result in severe consequences should arise the research attention in this field and 
cannot be neglected. A few preliminary studies were performed in investigating the 
third-party interference on failure frequency by pipeline diameter [39] and in employing 
a self-organizing maps (SOMs) to evaluate the third-party risk pattern[40]. The latter 
study proposed to use SOM algorithm to reveal main relationships among pipeline 
section variables. However, there is no such a systematic risk assessment study to 
distinctively analyze third-party damage on pipeline based on the two different impulses.  
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1.3 Motivation 
 Maintaining the integrity of pipeline from a number of factors is a far-reaching 
and challenging subject. It is a vital responsibility for companies of oil and gas industry 
to prevent significant pipeline failures and mitigate potential consequences both in the 
technical aspect and in the management aspect.  
 Risk assessments on pipeline focusing on more controllable factors such as 
corrosion have been performed with rich results, leading to the considerable decrease in 
pipeline failure of corrosion during the past decades. In contrast, the other leading cause, 
third-party damage is still resistant since it’s quite difficult to forecast or control in 
advance. In this context, a systematic risk assessment study that distinctively analyzes 
third-party damage on pipeline will be developed based on the two different impulses.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 The main purpose of this thesis research is to build models to distinctively 
investigate the third-party interference (malicious damage vs. accidental damage) on 
pipeline. In order to reach the goal, the following objectives are settled: 
• To demonstrate pipeline risk factors of accidental third-party damage by with 
Bayesian network approach.    
• To predict the probability of pipeline segment failure due to accidental third-
party damage with good consistency of real data. 
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• To device a game theory model to understand the risk pattern and sort out messy 
scenarios. This will help to support decisions defending malicious third-party 
damage and mitigate consequences result from the adversarial acts.  
 
1.5 Organization of This Thesis 
 This thesis is organized into five sections: 
 Section 1 provides background information that states the important role of oil 
and gas industry in global energy market, the advantages of using pipeline to transport 
hazardous materials such as petroleum and natural gas, and the severe consequences of 
pipeline failure. The later part of this section gives the literature review within this 
subject. 
 Section 2 presents the general introduction of methodologies that will be applied 
in the models (developed in later sections) to study the third-party damage on pipeline 
risk assessment. Bayesian network and game theory will be briefly addressed. 
 Sections 3 and 4 will each explore a model to examine the risk from the 
accidental third-party interference and the intentional third-party activities. The former 
model is formulated with Bayesian network approach, visualizing the cause-effect 
relationship among diverse risk attributes, and at the end predicts the probability of 
pipeline failure. The latter model is established by game theory to establish and sorts out 
a variety of security related risk scenarios.  
 Section 5 is devoted to make conclusions, and recommendations for future work.  
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Bayes’ Theorem and Bayesian Network 
 Probability of occurrence was inclined to be treated constant and independent in 
many fundamental models, while in the real-world case, that’s probably not true. The 
belief in Bayes’ Theorem is that all probabilities are conditional. Assuming there are two 
events H and E, where H is a hypothesis that can cause event E. Oppositely, E is the 
evidence that reflects an effect from H and thus the two events are mutually dependent. 
Let’s also assert that events E and H are the only two nodes in the system. In this case, 
the terminology of probability E, represented as P(E) would be more accurate to be 
substituted as P(E|H), where event H indeed is the background or context that can 
strongly affects E [41]. Similarly, the term P(H|E) represents the probability of H given 
by the information of E. The Bayes’ Theorem summarized this relationship between the 
probability of the occurrence of E and H by a succinct equation:  
! "	 $) = 	! $	 ")!(")!($)                                               ( 1 ) 
 The correlation can be expanded as much as one desired depending on the 
subjective scenarios, bringing more relevant events. Thus, the joint probability of event 
E, P(E), is derived by a series of conjugated events H = H1, H2, …, Hn shown as: 
! " = 	 ! "	 	%&)!(%&))&*+                                           ( 2 ) 
With this revision, the probability is given by: 
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! "# $ = 	!("#, $)!($) = 	 !("#, $)! $	 	"#)!("#)*#+,                              ( 3 ) 
 Bayes’ Theorem is highly adaptive that allows us to update or change the 
predictions and diagnoses based on the new knowledge and observations in hand [41]. 
The formula can be rewritten as follows [42] when new data got observed. The posterior 
probability is able to get revised from time to time when new evidence is obtained, 
where the system uncertainty can thus be reduced. 
!"#$%&'"&	)&"*+*','$- = 	/'0%,'ℎ""2	×	!&'"&	)&"*+*','$-4+&5'6+,	/'0%,'ℎ""2                  ( 4 ) 
 With the understanding of Bayes’ Theorem, Bayesian networks can be 
established by identifying variable nodes, building interrelated cause-effect relationship 
and putting initial data. Variable nodes directly linked by arrows are computed via the 
fundamental basis of Bayes’ Theorem for probabilistic reasoning. The increasing 
number of associated variable nodes propagates the Bayesian network. Figure 10. 
demonstrated a simple example of Bayesian network.  
 The Bayes’ Theorem has been proved to be a very powerful tool in a wide range 
of domains such as artificial intelligence, brain imaging, machine learning, human object 
recognition. The success in the application of Bayes’ Theorem in the above spectrum 
inspired people to use the same tool in process safety and risk assessment modeling and 
gained notable results [43, 44].  
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Figure 10. An example of Bayesian network. 
 
 
 
2.2 Game Theory 
 Game theory is a science that uses mathematical models of conflict and 
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers where insights and solutions 
are offered for a general scope of domain such as economics, politics and social 
situations [45]. As suggested by Myerson, the name of “game theory” might be more 
descriptive and easy for understanding when replaced by the terms like “conflict 
analysis” or “interactive decision theory” [45], since it ultimately analyzes how two or 
more individuals influencing the other’s benefit based on his or her behavior.   
 In view of the history, much of the early work of game theory was established by 
many scholars during World War II in order to deal with different kinds of controversial 
situations. With the progress of civilization and physical technologies, people were 
increasingly facing more dilemma such as nuclear power, which called for deeper and 
broader study on way of handling problems. The modern game theory focuses on 
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important economics application with the arts of tackling complications and it has been 
brought into horizons by awarding the Nobel Prize to a group of wise game-theorists. 
Till now, eleven game-theorists have won the economics Nobel Prize for their 
remarkable contributions.  
 For a better understanding in the model that was built for intentional third-party 
damage with game theory in the fourth section of this manuscript, some of the basis and 
terminology will be defined here. And a classic example will later be presented to 
reinforce these concepts.  
 Game: a game encompasses a collection of decision-makers, the possible 
information states of each decision-maker at each decision time, the collection of 
possible moves, a procedure for determining how the action choices of all players 
determine the possible outcomes and the preferences of individual decision-maker over 
these outcomes.  
 Player: each participant (interested party) that makes decisions in a game. 
 Strategy: a player decides his or her course of action from the list of action 
during the game. There are two types of strategies, pure strategy and mixed strategy 
depending on the magnitude of cooperation between players. Pure strategy stands for a 
single course of action for each player, while mixed strategy means a course of action 
for each player in accordance with some particular probability of distribution. The model 
built in section four only take pure strategies.  
 Payoff: the outcome of playing the game for each player. 
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 Saddle point: is one of the payoff combinations of players shown in the payoff 
matrix that has the smallest value in its row and the largest value in its column. The 
saddle point is considered as an equilibrium point in a zero-sum game (will be explained 
later of this section) that results in a solution based on Min-Max theorem [46].  
 Nash Equilibrium: a specific n-player combination feasible strategy S* with each 
player i, where !* = !$*	×	!'	*×	∙∙∙	×	!)*	  that no player perceives a way of achieving a 
higher payoff by switching strategies while all the other players keep theirs unchanged 
[47]. This current strategy set with the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash 
Equilibrium. In other words, Nash Equilibrium is a solution among all the available 
strategy combinations of players to have a best result from each individual point of view. 
Basically, the choice of strategy to each player is the best response towards a 
comprehensive consideration of what others will decide to choose. At this point, each 
player makes what he thinks the optimal decision under the current circumstance without 
any regrets. Therefore, the status of this point where no player wants to change his mind 
any more is defined as Nash Equilibrium. Regarded as an alternative solution (the other 
solution is Min-max theorem), Nash Equilibrium can both solve zero-sum game and 
non-zero sum game.  
 Zero-sum game vs. Non-zero sum game: In a zero-sum game, the payoff for 
every combination strategy always adds to zero, and non-zero sum game has a net 
outcome greater or less than zero. The former type is more ideal, while the latter one is 
more dominant in today’s studies. 
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 Simultaneous vs. Sequential game: In a simultaneous game, players make 
decisions simultaneously without having any prior knowledge of opponent’s move. The 
investigation of this sort of game is analyzed by payoff matrices. Different from the 
static simultaneous game, a sequential game, known as dynamic game is denoted by 
decision trees where the later player has some information on the prior player’s move.  
 
2.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 To fully illustrate a game theory model in terms of its concepts and general 
operation mechanism, this section will address a very basic and famous example, the 
prisoner’s dilemma. This issue was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin 
Dresher working at RAND in 1950.  
 Two suspects A and B were under arrest. Each of them was in a solitary 
confinement with no means to communicate with the other. The police knew they were 
guilty but were lack of sufficient evidence. So the prosecutors then offered each the 
same bargain at the same time. Each prisoner had two choices, either confess the crime 
(betray the other) or remain silent (cooperate with the other).  
 As a result, there are four possible situations: 
• If A and B were honest and both betray the other, each of them would serve 8 
years in prison.  
• If A confessed and B remained silent, A will be set free while B will have a more 
severe punishment with a 10-year sentence. 
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• Similarly, if B confessed and A remained silent, B will be set free while A will 
have the 10-year sentence instead.  
• If A and B both took the opportunities and deny the offence, both of them will 
only be given 1-year sentence.  
 The four possible scenarios are summarized in Table 7 where the columns 
represent prisoner A’s behavior and the rows denote prisoner B’s choices. 
Correspondingly, the four situations are shown pairwise in parentheses and the values 
indicate payoff of prisoners A and B, respectively. For instance, the pair of (0, -10) 
implies that A will be free from jail and B will be sentenced for 10 years.  
 
 
Table 7. Payoff matrix of a standard prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
 
A\B 
 
Confess Deny 
 
Confess 
 
(-8, -8) (0, -10) 
 
Deny 
 
(-10, 0) (-1, -1) 
 
 
 
 The prisoner’s dilemma holistically is a non-zero sum simultaneous game where 
prisoners A and B are the two players got involved. Each of them have two strategies: 
confess or deny the crime, forming a total of four strategy combinations.  Since none of 
them was able to know the information about how the other will respond regarding with 
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the offer, this game is categorized as simultaneous game with the payoff indicating the 
number of years being sentenced.  
 It is apparent that the best payoff in the combination of strategies is (-1, -1) when 
both of the two prisoners kept silent. Interestingly, Nash equilibrium provides the 
solution of (-8, -8) that the rational and intelligent prisoners will tend to choose despite 
the plausible optimal outcome of (-1, -1).  That is because no matter what action the 
other prisoner will decide to take, confession always seems to be a better alternative. 
Supposing the other player denied, A (or B) is prone to choose confession because A (or 
B) can be set free rather than has 1-year sentence. Likewise, supposing the other player 
confessed, A (or B) still would prefer to choose confession since he would only get 8-
year sentence compared with 10 years. Eventually, both of them betrayed the other.  
 Game theory is a quantitative modeling process with strategic interaction 
between players. In addition to economics, the application of game theory can also be a 
valuable and promising tool that assists industry to sort out the messy scenarios, defend 
malicious activities with proper decisions, and ensure the personnel and property safety. 
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3. RISK ASSESSMENT OF UNINTENTIONAL PIPELINE THIRD-PARTY 
DAMAGE WITH BAYESIAN NETWORK (BN) 
 
 The statistics released by Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) under U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) indicates that 
third-party disturbance is among the top three causes attributing to the pipeline failure. 
15% to 18% pipeline incidents in U.S. were directly related to third-party intrusion, and 
this type of failure cause was responsible for approximately 50% of all pipeline incidents 
in Western European countries [39]. In spite of its considerable portion among the 
pipeline failure modes, third-party damage was far less stressed. Compared with 
corrosion and equipment failure which in a long time had attracted great attention from 
industry and had evolved with new technologies to reduce the failure rate, the pipeline 
failure caused by third-party damage is one of the least factors being considered during 
the pipeline hazard assessment stage. Therefore, this study is conducted aiming at 
investigating pipeline risk resulting from third-party damage, and will formulate risk 
assessment model to identify threats, prioritize risks and determine which integrity plan 
should apply to different pipeline segments given the condition of third-party 
interference.  
 The term of third-party damage refers to the interference on pipeline from 
activities of personnel not associated with the pipeline. In other words, a third-party is 
obviously neither a pipeline operator nor a contractor who serves to pipeline working 
properly and this failure mode is ascribed to incorrect operations and human error. On 
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the other hand, some literature concluded third-party damage with the description of 
external interference or outside forces which covered the aspect of natural forces like 
earth movements and seismic events. In this study, the third-party damage analysis 
would be addressed to investigate activities from personnel not associated with pipeline 
while excludes natural force impact. 
 The third-party damage can be either accidental disturbance caused by 
excavating in the vicinity of buried utilities without realizing the presence of oil and gas 
pipeline or malicious interference caused by sabotage or pilferage. Damage in both cases 
can lead to severe consequences, immediately jeopardizing life and property. Even 
interference that appears to be minor can undermine the integrity of the pipeline under a 
cumulative period of time, and eventually cause the pipeline failure. Nonetheless, the 
risk analysis of unintentional third-party interference and malicious acts are intuitively 
different. While the probability of pipeline failure due to unintentional third-party 
interference explicitly correlates with comparatively well-defined factors in terms of 
pipeline characteristics and maintenance, the risk pattern of malicious acts primarily 
relies on less straightforward variables such as the understanding of adversarial intention, 
facility criticality assessment and security vulnerability assessment [48]. For this reason, 
the study in these two modes (unintentional interference and malicious acts) of pipeline 
risk assessment due to third-party damage will be elaborated in separate sections 3 and 4, 
and this chapter will place emphasis on the risk assessment by unintentional third-party 
interference model simulation.  
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3.1 Unintentional Third-Party Damage BN Model Development 
 One of the commonly employed practices of pipeline risk assessment is the 
relative risk model known as risk scoring with threats weighted and summed up to 
generate a comprehensive value measuring an overall risk of a specific segment of 
pipeline. On the other hand, a number of pipeline operators and process experts through 
interview investigation implied a demand for a more probabilistic model being 
implemented, as this type of risk presentation can be easily interpreted and visualized to 
all levels of an organization. Consequently, the model developed in this section will 
combine the ideas from the two methods targeting to clarify the cause-effect mechanism 
of unintentional third-party damage and quantify the failure probability under this type 
of failure mode without loss flexibility.  
 The non-malicious third-party damage BN model is devised through the 
following stages and will be delineated with more details later in this section: 
1. Identify main components that impact the pipeline probability of failure due to 
unintentional third-party damage.  
2. Degrade each component with more fundamental factor analysis and create a 
graphical representation of the chain events to show the cause-effect dependency. 
3. Integrate fundamental factors by applying weighing factors and build a 
mathematical framework. 
4. Generate third-party disturbance index by combining main components 
throughout the Bayesian Network (BN). 
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5. Estimate pipeline failure probability due to unintentional third-party damage 
based on available historical data and current calculated risk score given pipeline 
performance and evident observations. 
6. Input data based on the evaluation of pipeline characteristics, expert judgements, 
historical failure experience and engineering modeling. Initial distributions were 
assigned and the assumed initial values are interchangeable once data are gleaned. 
 
 The first stage, independent hazard identification is largely seeking the main 
components that directly associate with pipeline risk performance specifically affected 
by unintentional third-damage. These main components could serve as incident leading 
and lagging indicators illustrating a sense of relative risk. The risk assessment of 
pipeline failure due to exposure to unintentional third-party intrusion is generally 
controlled by the following listed variables.  
Public awareness and education on third-party digging 
Location 
Cover  
Presence and performance of pipeline markers and barriers 
Patrolling 
One-call system 
Planning and new technologies 
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Public awareness and education on third-party digging 
A third-party intrusion is predominantly composed of excavation projects conducted by 
personnel who are irrelevant with the oil and gas pipeline. The digging process ranging 
from a building or utility construction to a house-owner installing swimming pool could 
accidentally hit or damage the pipeline and thus result in catastrophic consequence and 
monetary loss. To ultimately eliminate the potential hazards and mitigate the crisis 
where people are ignorant about the buried oil and gas pipeline location and the 
indication signs, the public should continuously cultivate and improve safety awareness 
on the third-party digging by launching public education program. A series of actions 
should be taken to assure proper digging procedures within the public education program.  
 To reduce the pipeline failure from household individual digging, mailout and 
regular door-to-door contact with neighboring community are very essential in spreading 
oil and gas pipeline safety culture as considered the first line of defense [30]. Good 
community education on pipeline third-party digging will not only provide the right 
guidance such as calling 811 to get notified about all digging information for every 
digging attempt, but also makes the residents as a part of pipeline protectors or patrollers. 
In general, the contact or meeting should be held at least once every year. 
 The risk communication among pipeline company, local government, and other 
utility companies plays an extremely important role in preventing pipeline failure from 
other constructional excavation. Local government should take the responsibility to 
arrange meetings before any excavation construction projects and make decisions of 
issuing the permits in the aftermath. During the meeting, pipeline company should be 
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committed to provide geologic information of the pipeline as precise as possible while 
utility companies are supposed to clearly state the processes involved in the ongoing 
plans.  
 The magnitude of public education on unintentional third-party damage 
reflecting governmental endeavors in coordination with pipeline companies, local 
community, and utility companies is divided into five levels from very low to very high 
and attributes 15% to the third-party disturbance index.  
Location 
 The likelihood that onshore pipeline being exposed to accidental third-party 
interference strongly relies on the location which is complicated and synthesized by a 
number of aspects such as population density, frequency of constructional activities, rail 
and road disturbance, the presence of other buried utilities, and wildlife activities, which 
are linked by arrows shown in the Bayesian network. In addition to determining the 
probability of the risk, the location is an indispensable element for failure outcome 
analysis as well by applying various physical consequence models. 
 The five aspects mentioned above measure the location impact on pipeline third-
party damage from different perspectives and perform as “parent” nodes to determine 
the condition of the “child” node of location. Each parent event is actually not assigned 
by an exact score but a discrete probability density function that describes the 
performance state. In contrast to the traditional risk scoring assessment that evaluates 
each variable with one certain credit, the probability density function leaves flexibility to 
manage the uncertainty of the risk. As the data is available, these parent nodes can be 
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filled with precisely known state; even though the information sometimes is incomplete 
or absent, soft observations and initial assumptions can be temporarily used to assess the 
risk. 
 It is apparent that more populated regions are more susceptible to the third-party 
interference. An example to demonstrate the tendency is that 35% of excavation damage 
during 1984-1987 occurred in Class 1 and 2 locations (shown in Table 10 defined by 
DOT pipeline regulations) as summarized in DOT gas pipeline incidents statistical report. 
More populated areas or regions with heavy and frequent construction activities 
correspond to a higher risk and lower risk score level in the “child” node of location. 
Locations with high volume of train and vehicle are prone to have the aboveground 
pipeline suffer outside force damage by car hit. In the meantime, the conditions of other 
buried utilities may affect the buried oil and gas pipeline integrity. An example is the 
Qingdao Sinopec pipeline explosion incident where sewage system intertwined the 
existing oil pipeline, which severely aggravated pipeline corrosion. Besides, the 
maintenance of other buried utilities could also introduce extra excavation equipment 
strike on the oil and gas pipeline. Other concerns include the wild animal disturbance in 
some areas. Large animals like bison can do damage to the pipeline instrumentation and 
pipe coatings.  
 In the calculation of location node, the aspects of population density, 
construction activities, train and vehicle, other buried utilities and wildlife damage weigh 
30%, 30%, 10%, 20% and 10%, respectively. Because of the great impact on the risk of 
unintentional third-party damage, the node location is weighing 20%.  
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Cover  
 The node Cover among the main risk variables serves as a passive protection 
layer from third-party damage. The effectiveness of cover protection depends on the 
depth and nature of the cover. Firm cover with adequate depth not only can conceal the 
pipeline but also protect it from earth moving equipment to some extent.  
 Study conducted by Mather et al., [39] revealed the relationship between pipeline 
failure frequency caused by third-party and the depth of cover based on the data source 
from European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) given by Table 8. For those 
pipelines that were buried with less than 31.50-inch cover only weight 10% in the 
overall operating experience but account for about 65% failure frequency. The pipeline 
failure frequency drastically decreases with increasing depth of cover, especially for the 
case when the depth reaches 31.50 inch and above. Nowadays, in U.S. three feet (36 in) 
is a standard cover depth as requested by many regulatory agencies for new buried 
pipeline construction [30]. The node Depth of Cover in the BN model can be assigned a 
point value within the score range from 0 to 100 according to the actual depth. This point 
value is determined by dividing the actual depth (with the unit of inch) by 45 and 
multiplying 100 (the score cannot exceed 100). For instance, the pipeline minimum 
buried depth is 36 inches and the score for the node Depth of Cover follows: 
36 inch of cover = 36 / 45 *100 = 80 points 
The initial points distribution is assumed with an average of 80 points in the normal 
distribution. Observations can be inserted into the model whenever the information is 
available. 
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Table 8. Third-party damage failure frequency per depth of cover 
 
Depth of 
cover (in) 
Number of 
failures 
Operating experience 
(mile-year) 
Total failure frequency 
(1000 mile-year)-1 
0 - 31.50  103   86,140   1.196  
31.50 - 39.37  248   664,512   0.373  
39.37+  120   479,925   0.250  
 
 
 
 The nature of cover is another criterion in assessing cover protection 
effectiveness. Enhanced materials such as concrete or asphalt in the surface layer and 
rock or slab in the soil layer can create an additional level of protection. Hence, an 
advance cover nature and deeper cover depth formulates a safer condition as presented in 
the node of Cover shown in the BN model. 
Presence and performance of pipeline markers and barriers 
 Oil and gas pipelines exist everywhere and are generally buried underground. 
Easily recognized markers and aboveground warning signs play a critical role in helping 
people to identify the location of pipeline corridor so that can successfully prevent 
accident third-party intrusion. Barriers like fence, tree and valve lockout are able to 
exempt an aboveground pipeline facility and instrument from third-party interference. 
Another best practice is to bury a warning tape which is commercially available along 
with the pipeline corridor. The highlighted strip reminds people who are digging in the 
right-of-way (ROW) area the presence of pipeline, and hopefully they will cease the 
excavation action when discover the warning tape. The node of Markers and Barriers 
attributes 10% to the third-party disturbance index.  
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Patrolling 
 Regular pipeline patrolling is intended to detect the abnormal pipeline condition 
ranging from more evident phenomenon such as pinhole or rupture on the surface of the 
pipeline to subtle indications like dead vegetation and the construction activities near the 
ROW. This visible inspection method is able to proactively spot imminent threats and 
terminate the third-party intrusions by periodic observations and becomes the only 
means to examine unreported pipeline digging when an official excavation notification 
system is absent.  
 Pipeline patrol is proved to be an effective way to directly fight with the third-
party damage, whose value is assessed by frequency and thoroughness. The number of 
ground and air patrol in a certain period of time increases the detection opportunity and 
the possibility of discovering potential hazards. Usually a cost-benefit analysis is 
performed to determine the optimal interval of patrol. The node of Frequency in the BN 
model is therefore derived with five kinds of schedules from less than once per month to 
daily. As to the patrol thoroughness, checklist is often utilized by patrol technician or 
observer to ensure various facets have been inspected. Apart from regular failure 
detection, involved aspects in relation to third-party intrusions include missing markers 
or warning signs, construction activities near the pipeline, indication of heavy traffic 
through the ROW, ROW encroachments, unauthorized acts, and third-party changes to 
slope or drainage. It is reasonable to assume that the average value of patrol 
thoroughness score is 80 out of 100 based on the patrolling mitigation study [30]. Again, 
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an initial probability density function is assigned, and an evaluator can input a real 
number in the Thoroughness node when applying this BN model.  
One-call system 
 The invention of one-call system offers an interactive platform for risk 
communications between the third-party ready to excavate and the pipeline protection 
agencies. This formal service requires landowner or excavation contractor to call to 
locate the exact pipeline buried site prior to the construction as well as to immediately 
notify any disturbance made to the pipeline. The one-call system successfully helped to 
avoid third-party intrusions and reduced the related incidents by 20% - 70% in the 
investigated sixteen one-call centers [49]. Key elements to evaluate the effectiveness of 
one-call system as the nodes presented in the BN model are Widely Advertised, 
Standard Establishment and Enforcement, and Appropriate Reactions to Calls.  
 Sufficient advertisement on one-call system ensures this service got fully utilized 
and the degree of community engagement largely affects the number of unreported 
excavations. In most states of the United State, participation to one-call is a law and 
obligatory. Therefore, industry standards and noncompliance penalty should be clearly 
addressed to guarantee the system working properly. For those countries lacking such 
formal notification system, it is urgent to develop similar program especially in the case 
where the number of oil and gas pipeline is tremendous. Finally, as the backbone of one-
call system, appropriate reactions to calls from general public or excavation contractors 
mean to arrange a sequence of actions in an efficient manner. Timely efforts should be 
made to recordkeeping and documentation, pre-job contact and communication, 
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dispatching personnel to mark pipeline location, guidance with accurate mapping, and 
site inspection during and after the excavation activities [30]. The above three aspects 
cooperatively reflect the overall one-call system performance and are illustrated in the 
graphical BN model shown in Figure 11.  
Planning and new technologies 
 As new sophisticated technologies emerging for safer excavation, the probability 
of pipeline being punctured by heavy equipment no doubt will be reduced with that 
application. Appropriately utilizing inherently safer techniques like hydro-vac excavator 
could avoid strikes on pipeline containing natural gas and petrochemical products at 
early stage. Beyond that, good planning and job safety analysis (JSA) are also conducive 
for third-party operators to realize the pipeline hazards so that risky events will be done 
with greater carefulness. 
 
3.2 Unintentional Third-Party Damage BN Model Algorithms 
 The Bayesian Network calculations are computed by the simulation software 
Agenarisk 7.0. A hybrid model was constructed through object-oriented interface 
containing discrete and continuous uncertain variables. The defined algorithms for 
unintentional third-party damage BN model is given be Table 9. 
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Table 9. Define algorithms for unintentional third-party damage BN model 
 
Node Name Unique 
Identifier 
Type Defined Equation 
Depth of Cover DofCover Fundamental 
Factor 
Continuous interval; TNorm (80, 25) 
Nature of Cover NofCover Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Normal, Enhanced, Excellent); TNorm 
(0.50, 0.1) 
Population 
Density 
Pop_Density Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very 
Low); TNorm (0.8, 0.07) 
Construction 
Activities 
Cstr_Act Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Very Frequent, Frequent, Medium, Rare, 
Very Rare); TNorm (0.75, 0.08) 
Train and 
Vehicle 
Train_Vehicle Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very 
Low); TNorm (0.70, 0.05) 
Other Buried 
Utilities 
Other_B_U Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Intensive, Moderate, None); TNorm 
(0.80, 0.04) 
Wildlife Damage Wild_Damage Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (High, Medium, Low); TNorm (0.70, 
0.03) 
Frequency Freq Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Less than once per month = 0.08, Less 
than four times per month = 0.12, One or two 
days per week = 0.30, Three or four days per 
week = 0.30, Daily = 0.20) 
Thoroughness Thoro Fundamental 
Factor 
Continuous interval; TNorm (80, 50) 
Widely 
Advertised 
Wide_Ad Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Low = 0.05, Medium = 0.55, High = 
0.40) 
Standard 
Establishment & 
Enforcement 
SEE Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Poor, Below Average, Average, Good, 
Excellent); TNorm (0.88, 0.20) 
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Node Name Unique 
Identifier 
Type Defined Equation 
Appropriate 
Reactions 
App_Rxn Fundamental 
Factor 
Ranked (Poor, Below Average, Average, Good, 
Excellent); TNorm (0.85, 0.10) 
Level of Public 
Education 
LofPub_Edu Background 
Factors 
Ranked (Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very 
High); TNorm (0.70, 0.05) 
Cover Cover Indicators Cover = (DofCover + NofCover *100*0.3)/1.3 
Location Location Indicators Location = (Pop_Density*3 + Cstr_Act*3 + 
Train_Vehicle + Other_B_U*2 + 
Wild_Damage)*100/10 
Plans and 
Technologies 
P_T Indicators Ranked (None = 0.10, Prepared = 0.70, Well-
prepared = 0.20) 
Markers and 
Barriers 
M_B Indicators Ranked (Poor, Below Average, Average, Good, 
Excellent); TNorm (0.90, 0.09) 
Patrol Patrol Indicators Patrol = (Freq*100 + Thoro)/2 
One-Call System One_Call Indicators Icdt_Rep = (Wide_Ad*0.15 + SEE*0.30 + 
App_Rxn*0.55)*100 
3rd Party 
Disturbance 
Index 
TParty Indexing 
Score 
TParty = Cover*0.20 + Location*0.20 + 
Patrol*0.15 + One_Call*0.15 + M_B*100*0.1 + 
LofPub_Edu*100*0.15 + P_T*100*0.05 
Estimated 
Pipeline Failure 
Probability 
Esti_Prob Estimated 
Probability 
Esti_Prob = 0.0362*/(1-TParty/100)/0.32 
 
 
 
3.3 Unintentional Third-Party Damage BN Model Application 
Risk modeling 
 The purpose of this model is to analyze the pipeline risk posed by unintentional 
third-party interference, thereby forming an optimal risk management for control and 
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mitigation. Having developed the framework of BN model on unintentional pipeline 
third-party damage analysis as described in previous sections, we can now focus on the 
actual steps for model application. The integration of relative risk scoring approach and 
quantitative risk assessment in this model makes it possible to estimate not only the 
relative risk, but a quantified probability of failure. The seven main risk variables 
(displayed as pink nodes in Figure 11) explained earlier in the chapter each contains 
various sub-factors (exhibited as blue nodes) that determine the magnitude of pipeline 
risk susceptibility from unintentional third-party intrusions. These main risk attributes 
then formed a holistic third-party disturbance index (shown in the yellow node) and built 
a network that coordinates cause-effect relationships as demonstrated in Figure 11. 
Moreover, this third-party disturbance index can be further converted to an absolute risk 
value by incorporating reliable historical data to obtain an estimated pipeline failure 
probability (presented in the green node).  
Data collection and preparation 
 An accurate and meaningful pipeline risk assessment in large part depends on the 
quality and availability of data. Gathering the data means to achieve everything that 
relates to the pipeline. In this case, information includes origin construction data, 
environmental conditions, pipeline geological conditions, patrolling schedule and so on. 
If data is less straightforward or hard to access, expert judgement, empirical modeling 
and historical experience are alternatives to seek for solutions. Initial probability density 
functions were assumed and applied for the risk nodes in the model, which is shown in 
Table 9. The overall third-party disturbance risk score has an average value about 68 out 
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of 100 (given by Figure 12) and the first quartile and third quartile are 64 and 72, 
respectively. Accordingly, the average of oil and gas pipeline failure probability due to 
third-party damage in the period of 2011-2015 is 0.0362 per 1000 mile-year. Thus, a 
quantitative correlation between the risk index and estimated failure probability can be 
obtained and is listed in the last cell of Table 9.  
Segmentation  
 Because risks are rarely constant along a pipeline, in industrial practice, pipeline 
is designed to be divided into segments that hold concurrent characteristics such as 
material, function and terrain. Each classified segment will be examined through such a 
risk model presented in this work with a series of relevant data being input (Figures 11 
and 12) and will be ended up with a relative risk score based on their performance.  
Assessing risks 
 In real case, with updated information in hand, we can input data to the nodes in 
this third-party risk model and generate a relative risk score as well as estimated 
probability of failure for that investigated pipeline segment. An example is given in 
Figure 13 when data is available on public education and one-call system nodes 
assuming local government had done excellent job in advertising public pipeline safety 
culture and establishing a sound one-call system. As inserting the observation into the 
sub-factor nodes of Level of Publication Education, Widely Advertised, Standard 
Establishment and Enforcement, and Appropriate Reactions, a higher performance 
scenario is formed with the mean value of 75 for third-party disturbance index and an 
estimated failure rate of 0.028 per 1000 mile-year. This improvement in community 
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excavation education and one-call system indeed has considerably reduced the risk from 
third-party interference. Similar risk assessing can be conducted following the same 
procedures.  
Managing risks 
 A series of pipeline segments will undergo this type of risk model and create 
unique risk scores. In view of these scores, one can easily obtain the risk ranking based 
on the calculated results. The score order has huge significance that can benefit risk 
management when deciding how to allocate resource in the pipeline integrity program. 
In other words, knowing the different level of risks for each pipeline segment, we can 
prioritize the segments for patrolling and inspection, therefore, tailor a more suitable 
plan to control and mitigate the risks.  
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Figure 11. Overview of unintentional third-party damage BN model 
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(a)                (b) 
Figure 12. Unintentional third-party damage BN model with initial data assumptions. (a) Statistics of 3rd Party Disturbance Index 
node. (b) Statistics of Estimated Pipeline Failure Probability node.  
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Figure 13. Unintentional third-party damage BN model results given partial information of public education
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4. PIPELINE SECURITY ASSESSMENT WITH GAME THEORY 
 
 In the United States, the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) under the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) oversees the pipeline safety with regards to aspects such as 
corrosion, equipment failure and accidental third-party damage. The fact that numerous 
amount of oil and gas were carried over the U.S. by pipeline attracted the attention of 
pipeline industry and government who had made substantial investments each year to 
protect these systems against terror attacks or pilferage. At the same time, due to its 
economic status and inherent vulnerability of pipeline, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is 
continuously working on all fashions of transportation security including pipelines [50]. 
Though the two agencies have distinct missions on pipeline, some of the responsibilities 
are overlapping and have the same ultimate goal.  
 Similar to the allocation of government agencies, the traditional safety analysis 
together with a security related pipeline risk assessment should both be involved which 
are indispensable elements in a complete risk investigation. Since the malicious third-
party interferences at most time are highly unpredictable and usually lead to very 
extreme consequences, the uncertainty and the risk generated by this pattern are gigantic. 
It should be noted that the threats from intentional third-party interferences differ from 
the accidental ones because of the intrinsic challenge from forecasting, and the 
complexation of chaotic psychology-based scenarios. On the contrary, the unintentional 
threats relying on tangible factors are able to formulate a model to characterize 
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probabilities of failure and risks qualitatively and quantitatively. Thus, the conventional 
probabilistic risk assessment like previously elaborated in section three with Bayesian 
network evaluating accidental third-party damage on pipeline no longer applies here and, 
other alternative methods that can support decision-making for preventing or mitigating 
malicious interferences with security related heuristic algorithms are required. 
 
4.1 Using Game-Theoretic Model for Pipeline Security Measurement 
 Industrial safety specialists and stakeholders are always struggling to yield a best 
trade-off between investment on protection systems of the infrastructure and the 
production costs. Questions like how to balance the finite recourses, how to allocate 
adequate safety and security investment have been raised frequently.  
 To deal with these problems on pipeline security, a security related game theory 
model is developed to sort out potentially messy scenarios and to support decisions for 
preventing or mitigating the adversarial acts throughout the administration and risk 
management in the government or industrial companies. This section will present this 
game-theoretic model for pipeline security measurement on intentional third-party 
damage to the property considering different levels of pipeline security risk and its own 
features. 
 To begin with, we need full knowledge on ourselves (pipeline security risk) and 
the enemies (targets of the terrorist) as the oldest version of game theory book, the Art of 
War by the Chinese Sun-Tzu goes that if you know the enemy and know yourself, you 
need not fear the result of a hundred battles; if you know yourself but not the enemy, for 
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every victory gained you will also suffer a defect; if you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle [51]. 
Clarify the aims and ideology for terrorists 
 Terrorists tend to intentionally destroy pipelines resulting in release, fire and 
explosion and try to maximize the casualty, social chaos, disruptions and economic 
losses to grab attention of local or global authorities and to other political purposes.  
Define security risk level of pipeline based on location classification 
 The pipeline security risk level is summarized in Table 10. Initially, the concept 
of location class (1, 2, 3 and 4) elaborated by 49 CFR Part 192 [52] (shown in the last 
two columns in Table 10) is aiming at identifying the pipeline characteristics as a basis 
for applying corresponding construction codes or standards, being able to decide how the 
integrity management program (IM) should be implemented and what will be the 
magnitude being implemented. In practice, during the design stage, one of the design 
factors (F) that provides a coefficient in the formula for steel pipe pressure design relies 
on the location classification and equals to 0.72 for Class 1 location, 0.60 for Class 2 
location, 0.50 for Class 3 location and 0.40 for Class 4 location. The four classes actually 
depict the urbanization from more rural areas (class 1 or 2) to more urban regions (class 
3 or 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
 
 
Table 10. Pipeline security risk level classification. 
i Security Level Location Description (49 CFR Part 192) [52] 
1 Less vulnerable Class1 A Class 1 location is any 1-mile section of pipeline that 
has 10 or fewer buildings intended for human 
occupancy. This includes areas such as: Wastelands, 
Deserts, Rugged mountains, Grazing land, Farmland and 
Sparsely populated areas. 
2 Moderately 
vulnerable 
Class2 This is any 1-mile section of pipeline that has more than 
10 but fewer than 46 buildings intended for human 
occupancy. This includes fringe areas around cities and 
towns, industrial areas, and ranch or country estates. 
3 Vulnerable Class3 This is any 1-mile section of pipeline that has 46 or 
more buildings intended for human occupancy except 
when a Class 4 Location prevails. This includes: 
Suburban housing developments, Shopping centers, 
Residential areas, Industrial areas and Other populated 
areas not meeting Class 4 Location requirements. 
4 Highly 
vulnerable 
Class4 This is any 1-mile section of pipeline where multistory 
buildings are prevalent, traffic is heavy or dense, and 
where there may be numerous other utilities 
underground. Multistory means four or more floors 
above ground including the first, or ground, floor. The 
depth of basements or number of basement floors is 
immaterial. 
 
 
 
 The pipeline security risk level is also highly correlated with the pipeline 
geography in view of both attackers and defenders. In fact, the philosophy of attackers is 
to maximize the total expected damage, which is inclined to have more people and 
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facilities get involved. There is a higher probability for attackers to choose an area that 
multistory buildings are prevalent, traffic is dense and population is concentrated over a 
sparsely populated location. Therefore, it is reasonable to assign the same pipeline 
location class to the pipeline security risk level denoted by i where i = 1, 2, 3 or 4. In this 
model, the pipeline security risk level is similarly divided into four categories in 
accordance with the four location classes: less vulnerable (i = 1), moderately vulnerable 
(i = 2), vulnerable (i = 3) and highly vulnerable (i = 4) as listed in the first two columns 
of Table 10. The increasing numeric value i indicates the increasing intrinsic potential of 
pipeline being attacked and the degree of urbanization. 
 Although in this case, the pipeline security risk level is directly associated with 
geological factors in order to reduce the complexation, the pipeline security level should 
not be limited to only considering this aspect. It should be noted that additional factors 
such as the possible consequence of a pipeline incident occurred in the area, the real 
concentration of population and the facility used frequency cannot be ignored when 
comprehensively determining the risk level in the real-world. This criticality assessment 
is a part of security related risk analysis. Besides, the security risk level of a specific 
pipeline segment could not be taken for granted as a constant value in most cases. 
Derived from Gas Transmission and Distribution Pipeline Systems initial pipeline safety 
regulation (ASME B31.8 Location Class), the pipeline security risk level will change as 
the population grows or people moving out from the area that close to pipeline facilities, 
which updates the risk level i.  
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Define players and possible strategy scales in the game-theoretic model 
 Generally, in the game theoretic model players are strategic decision makers 
within the context of the game where a diametrically opposed conflict exists. It is clear 
that we have two players/sides within the game, defenders and attackers. 
 Player1 Defenders (D): government, public or private pipeline institution and 
industrial companies that ensure the safety and security of pipelines and make great 
efforts to mitigate incident consequences. 
 Player2 Attackers (A): vandal or/and terrorist that attack the pipeline to arise 
social panic for some political purposes. 
 The strategy is a complete plan of action that a player will take given a set of 
circumstances according to the game theory. We assert that for each pipeline security 
risk level, i where i = 1, 2, 3 or 4, both defenders and attackers have five levels of 
strategies marked as DS1, DS2, DS3, DS4, DS5 and AS1, AS2, AS3, AS4, AS5, respectively. 
The five-level scaled strategy system are inspired by the U.S. Homeland Security 
Advisory System which classified five-level alarms in response to a terrorist attack. The 
five colors (green, blue, yellow, orange and red) from the bottom to the top show an 
increasing terrorism alert from low risk to severe risk, which is demonstrated by Figure 
14. Once released the alarm code, the U.S. government would take the corresponding 
action against the impending or occurred terrorist attack. In the same way, each strategy 
in this model for defenders (DS1 to DS5) and attackers (AS1 to AS5) triggers a series of 
countermeasures to confront the opponent, taking advantages of various resources 
including human resources, technologies, and industrial capability. The degree of 
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allocating resources is no doubt associated with the specific scale in the serial strategies. 
Moreover, the detailed criteria and boundary conditions for the strategy levels should be 
defined case by case depending on the current scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. United States Department of Homeland Security Advisory System to terrorist 
attacks [53]. 
 
 
 
Apply the common ratio from contest success function [54]: 
!" #", %" = #"#" + ("%"                                                ( 5 ) !"   : probability of pipeline being successfully attacked by intentional damage (implying 
the chance that attackers win the game) given by specific pipeline security risk level i.  
Ai : strategies that an attacker may take under the condition of security risk level i.  
Di : strategies that a defender may take under the condition of security risk level i. 
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!"   : the relative defense/attack effectiveness ratio for pipeline security risk level i.  
 We can assume that !"   follow the order: !" > !$ > !% > !&  , which means that 
defense/attack effectiveness remain lowest in the case where pipeline located in densely 
populated areas and is very vulnerable according to the security risk level (i=4) while the 
less vulnerable security risk level (i=1) tends to be the easiest to defend. Symmetrically, !"   is the resistance of the pipeline that survived through the damage under defender’s 
protection (implying the chance that defenders win the game). The relationship between 
Ri and Pi is summarized by the below equation: !" = 1 − &"                                                        ( 6 ) 
Thus, it’s not hard to derive: !"#/!%# 	≤ 0                                                       ( 7 ) !"#/!%# 	≥ 0                                                       ( 8 ) 
or !"#/!%# 	≥ 0                                                       ( 9 ) !"#/!%# 	≤ 0                                                     ( 10 ) 
 Ideally, supposing that the relative defense/attack effectiveness ratio !"   equals to 
1 and the attacker as well as the defender adopt the same level of strategies to contest, 
the outcome of Pi or Ri is 50%, which becomes a fair game. In other words, every action 
taking to attack or defend is sufficiently (100 %) effective while both parties have the 
same scale of countermeasures, so the chance to win (or lose) the game for each side is 
fifty-fifty. Unfortunately, in the real world, the pipeline protection game cannot have a 
100% defense effectiveness.  
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Utility function [55] v" = $" + &" + ' ∙ ℎ"                                                ( 11 ) 
where v"   is the expected loss index given by a successful attack composed of financial 
loss !"   , environmental damage !"    and the human loss term ! ∙ ℎ$   . ℎ"    represents the 
accumulative human loss such as trauma, severe burns, respiratory impairment and 
fatality during an attack, and the coefficient c convert the overall human loss to the 
monetary index.   
Maximize the utility functions 
! ", $ = &' ∙ 1 − +' "', $' -	. ∙ $'/'                             ( 12 ) 
! ",$ = &' ∙ )' "', $' -+ ∙ "','                                  ( 13 ) 
 In general, both players in the game are eager to maximizing the payoff as their 
ultimate goal. The attackers are apt to maximize the total expected damage while 
minimizing the costs of the action. Similarly, defenders are willing to maximize the 
assets that they have preserved from an attack subtracting the protection costs. The 
utility functions with regards to payoffs are illustrated in the above equations, and u(A, 
D) as well as U(A, D) represent the payoffs for defenders and attackers, respectively. b 
and B in these equations are the unit costs for defense and attack, respectively. 
Concerning the fact that the costs of protection are always much higher than the costs of 
an attack, we conclude that b >> B. How cheap is the cost of B? The Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defect Organization, a Pentagon organization has released an 
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estimation of terrorist attack costs that provide us some monetary sense. An attack made 
by using a remote-controlled bomb is only about $400; a suicide bombing vest is $1200 
and a suicide car bomb can vary between $13,000 and $20,000 depending on the car 
model [55]. Compared with the much lower cost of attack, the expenditures for blocking 
and fighting terrorism are no doubt many times over the attack costs. 
Data assumption and processing  
 In principle, the main idea of developing this game theoretic model for defending 
malicious pipeline damage is to help tide up conditions with an array of factors and 
make decisions based on computed payoff values. In order to elaborate the model, some 
initial values are needed but may not be available from this standpoint. Therefore, a few 
data assumptions will be performed for further processing. Those piece of data can be 
replaced once the real data are available in practical cases.  
 Five sets of strategies are available for defender and attacker under various 
pipeline security risk level i, where i = 1, 2, 3 or 4. The scales regarding different sets of 
strategies are from 1 (low defending/attacking level) to 5 (severe defending/attacking 
level) shown in Table 11 while the level of countermeasures is expanded as the scale-
point increasing. The assuming strategy scales are identical for both defender and 
attacker under the same security level of i. With five possible strategies in hand for each 
party, there are 25 pairs of strategy in total towards all pipeline security levels as 
indicated in Table 12. 
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Table 11. Five sets of strategies for defender or attacker under various pipeline security 
risk levels. 
 
Strategy 
Security risk level 
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 
DS1/AS1 1 2 2 3 
DS2/AS2 1 2 3 4 
DS3/AS3 2 3 3 4 
DS4/AS4 2 3 4 5 
DS5/AS5 3 4 4 5 
 
 
 
 Having collected the levels of strategies, the probability of a successful malicious 
damage to pipeline !" #", %"   can be determined by plugging the defense/attack 
effectiveness !"   . We suppose the defense/attack effectiveness !"  = 80% , !"  = 70% , !"  = 
60% and !"  = 50% based on the nature of the four pipeline security levels as mentioned 
earlier in this section. Accordingly, the estimated probabilities of pipeline being 
successfully attacked by malicious damage are computed based on different strategy 
planning and are summarized in Table 13. 
 Furthermore, in the utility function, asserted values of financial loss !"   , 
environmental damage !"   and accumulative human loss ℎ"   are also listed in Table 14 for 
each pipeline security level i.  
 In our example, we also set c = 200 to transfer human loss to monetary index, b = 
50 and B = 5 where b = 10B to express a sense of that the costs by defenders are always 
much higher than the costs by attackers. The exact values of above assumptions are 
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subject to more discussion when approaching to the real scenarios, yet are beyond the 
scope of this research. 
 
 
Table 12. 25 pairs of strategy towards all pipeline security levels. 
 
Obs  Strategy  D(i=1)  D(i=2) D(i=3) D(i=4)  A(i=1) A(i=2) A(i=3) A(i=4) 
1 DS1 AS1  1 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 
2 DS1 AS2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 4 
3 DS1 AS3 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 
4 DS1 AS4 1 2 2 3 2 3 4 5 
5 DS1 AS5 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 
6 DS2 AS1  1 2 3 4 1 2 2 3 
7 DS2 AS2 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
8 DS2 AS3 1 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 
9 DS2 AS4 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 5 
10 DS2 AS5 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 5 
11 DS3 AS1  2 3 3 4 1 2 2 3 
12 DS3 AS2 2 3 3 4 1 2 3 4 
13 DS3 AS3 2 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 
14 DS3 AS4 2 3 3 4 2 3 4 5 
15 DS3 AS5 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 
16 DS4 AS1  2 3 4 5 1 2 2 3 
17 DS4 AS2 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 
18 DS4 AS3 2 3 4 5 2 3 3 4 
19 DS4 AS4 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
20 DS4 AS5 2 3 4 5 3 4 4 5 
21 DS5 AS1  3 4 4 5 1 2 2 3 
22 DS5 AS2 3 4 4 5 1 2 3 4 
23 DS5 AS3 3 4 4 5 2 3 3 4 
24 DS5 AS4 3 4 4 5 2 3 4 5 
25 DS5 AS5 3 4 4 5 3 4 4 5 
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Table 13. Estimated probability of pipeline failure due to malicious damage based on 
different strategy planning for all pipeline security levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs Strategy  P(i=1)  P(i=2)  P(i=3)  P(i=4)  
1 DS1 AS1  0.55556 0.58824 0.62500 0.66667 
2 DS1 AS2 0.55556 0.58824 0.71429 0.72727 
3 DS1 AS3 0.71429 0.68182 0.71429 0.72727 
4 DS1 AS4 0.71429 0.68182 0.76923 0.76923 
5 DS1 AS5 0.78947 0.74074 0.76923 0.76923 
6 DS2 AS1  0.55556 0.58824 0.52632 0.60000 
7 DS2 AS2 0.55556 0.58824 0.62500 0.66667 
8 DS2 AS3 0.71429 0.68182 0.62500 0.66667 
9 DS2 AS4 0.71429 0.68182 0.68966 0.71429 
10 DS2 AS5 0.78947 0.74074 0.68966 0.71429 
11 DS3 AS1  0.38462 0.48780 0.52632 0.60000 
12 DS3 AS2 0.38462 0.48780 0.62500 0.66667 
13 DS3 AS3 0.55556 0.58824 0.62500 0.66667 
14 DS3 AS4 0.55556 0.58824 0.68966 0.71429 
15 DS3 AS5 0.65217 0.65574 0.68966 0.71429 
16 DS4 AS1  0.38462 0.48780 0.45455 0.54545 
17 DS4 AS2 0.38462 0.48780 0.55556 0.61538 
18 DS4 AS3 0.55556 0.58824 0.55556 0.61538 
19 DS4 AS4 0.55556 0.58824 0.62500 0.66667 
20 DS4 AS5 0.65217 0.65574 0.62500 0.66667 
21 DS5 AS1  0.29412 0.41667 0.45455 0.54545 
22 DS5 AS2 0.29412 0.41667 0.55556 0.61538 
23 DS5 AS3 0.45455 0.51724 0.55556 0.61538 
24 DS5 AS4 0.45455 0.51724 0.62500 0.66667 
25 DS5 AS5 0.55556 0.58824 0.62500 0.66667 
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Table 14. Associated values of financial loss, environmental damage and accumulative 
human loss under various pipeline security risk levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 With the associated values in Table 14 and equation 11, the utility functions in 
terms of each pipeline security risk level can be easily calculated. The holistic payoffs 
for defender and attacker can then be obtained via equations 12 and 13, respectively and 
the results are demonstrated in Table 15.  
 All the computations of the model were conducted by SAS (Statistical Analysis 
Solution) software which can conveniently manage vast quantity of data and perform 
predictive analysis. In more practical cases, the amount of data might increase 
exponentially when putting additional factors into the calculation. Because of this, it is 
overwhelmingly essential to use external data manipulating software to help efficiently 
accomplish the task. SAS (r) Proprietary Software 9.4 (TS1M3) licensed to TEXAS 
A&M UNIVERSITY - SFA T&R, Site 70080787 is executed on the X64_8PRO 
platform with V9 Engine. The code and data log of this model programming will be 
attached in the appendix at the end of this thesis. 
 
 
Parameters 
Security risk level 
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 !"  100 200 300 400 !"  120 90 60 30 !"  5 15 25 35 
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Table 15. Summarized utility function based on different pairs of strategies for all pipeline 
security levels.  
 
Obs Strategy  u(i=1)  u(i=2)  u(i=3)  u(i=4)  U(i=1) U(i=2) U(i=3) U(i=4) u(A,D)  U(A,D) 
1 DS1 AS1  492 1255 1910 2327 673 1925 3340 4938 5984 10876 
2 DS1 AS2 492 1255 1431 1876 673 1925 3814 5384 5055 11795 
3 DS1 AS3 299 947 1431 1876 861 2228 3814 5384 4553 12287 
4 DS1 AS4 299 947 1137 1565 861 2228 4103 5690 3947 12883 
5 DS1 AS5 207 753 1137 1565 948 2417 4103 5690 3661 13159 
6 DS2 AS1  492 1255 2389 2772 673 1925 2811 4443 6908 9852 
7 DS2 AS2 492 1255 1860 2277 673 1925 3335 4933 5884 10866 
8 DS2 AS3 299 947 1860 2277 861 2228 3335 4933 5382 11358 
9 DS2 AS4 299 947 1513 1923 861 2228 3677 5282 4682 12048 
10 DS2 AS5 207 753 1513 1923 948 2417 3677 5282 4396 12324 
11 DS3 AS1  651 1535 2389 2772 464 1595 2811 4443 7347 9313 
12 DS3 AS2 651 1535 1860 2277 464 1595 3335 4933 6323 10327 
13 DS3 AS3 442 1205 1860 2277 668 1920 3335 4933 5784 10856 
14 DS3 AS4 442 1205 1513 1923 668 1920 3677 5282 5083 11547 
15 DS3 AS5 324 983 1513 1923 781 2137 3677 5282 4743 11877 
16 DS4 AS1  651 1535 2724 3127 464 1595 2426 4038 8037 8523 
17 DS4 AS2 651 1535 2182 2608 464 1595 2963 4552 6976 9574 
18 DS4 AS3 442 1205 2182 2608 668 1920 2963 4552 6437 10103 
19 DS4 AS4 442 1205 1810 2227 668 1920 3330 4928 5684 10846 
20 DS4 AS5 324 983 1810 2227 781 2137 3330 4928 5344 11176 
21 DS5 AS1  711 1719 2724 3127 354 1361 2426 4038 8281 8179 
22 DS5 AS2 711 1719 2182 2608 354 1361 2963 4552 7220 9230 
23 DS5 AS3 515 1388 2182 2608 545 1687 2963 4552 6694 9746 
24 DS5 AS4 515 1388 1810 2227 545 1687 3330 4928 5940 10490 
25 DS5 AS5 392 1155 1810 2227 663 1915 3330 4928 5584 10836 
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Model Outcome: Simultaneous Manner (Payoff matrix) 
 One way to examine the game is inspecting it in a simultaneous fashion 
supposing both involved players have no clue to the other’s strategy choice. In other 
words, government or pipeline companies have no indication about what attack scale 
will be, at the same time, the pipeline attackers lack the suggestive information on how 
the countermeasures the opponent will take. Typically, the payoff matrix is a 
predominant way to study this game mode.   
 Once gained the computed utility functions for defender [u(A, D)] and attacker 
[U(A, D)] under different combinations of strategies (implied in the last two columns of 
Table 15), the payoff matrix can be framed as a handy understanding representation 
shown in Table 16. Similar to the payoff matrix in the Prisoner’s Dilemma example, the 
row exhibited the five possible strategies for one party: attacker, while the column 
presented the five possible strategies for the other party: defender. Each cell in the 
matrix shown pair-wisely in parentheses reports the payoffs of the defender and the 
attacker, respectively. By performing Nash Equilibrium that no player has a reason to 
choose a better action given that the other component adheres to a strategic profile of the 
game, a steady state can be reached as a solution for the game assuming both players are 
rational and intelligent to choose a correct action. After the application of the theory, the 
payoff result of DS5 AS5 with the value of (5584, 10836) indicates the equilibrium for 
this game and is displayed in bold in Table 16.  
 Despite the idealized setting that all players are rational and logical, the outcome 
from Nash Equilibrium under this setting still provides us insights to solve the problem 
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and make decisions by giving a stady state solution. In a simultaneous game, each player 
formulates independent thinking without extra information on the tendency of the other’s 
choice. In general, a good first step is to figure out the payoffs of all the players in the 
game, and then put yourself in the opponent’s shoes, to attempt to predict what they will 
do. In the game of secure pipeline, attackers are aiming at maximizing their utilities to 
generate chaos as much as they can by setting attack level to the highest scale. From the 
perspective of pipeline defenders, they are able to recognize the opponents’ philosophy 
and escalate the scale of prevention and mitigation to the highest level in response to the 
proposed attackers’ behavior. Thus, under the isolated planning, attacker will tend to 
choose the highest level of strategy AS5 while defender will tend to adopt the most 
intensive level of strategy DS5, which is in line with the results of Nash Equilibrium. 
 
 
Table 16. Payoff matrix based on different pairs of strategies.  
 
u \ U AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 
DS1 (5984, 10876) (5055, 11795) (4553, 12287) (3947, 12883) (3661, 13159) 
DS2 (6908, 9852) (5884, 10866) (5382, 11358) (4682, 12048) (4396, 12324) 
DS3 (7347, 9313) (6323, 10327) (5784, 10856) (5083, 11547) (4743, 11877) 
DS4 (8037, 8523) (6976, 9574) (6437, 10103) (5684, 10846) (5344, 11176) 
DS5 (8281, 8179) (7220, 9230) (6694, 9746) (5940, 10490) (5584, 10836) 
 
 
 
 The payoff pairs are then plotted in Figure 15 where the utility functions of 
attacker shown in orange line are mostly upwards and defender’s payoffs shown in blue 
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line are mostly downwards. This distribution of payoffs is mostly in good accordance 
with the real-world situations where pipeline defenders invest tons of resources in 
fighting against attackers and taking accountability to prevent the occurrence of 
incidents. However, perhaps at some point when attackers take a relatively lower level of 
strategy and defenders adopt a higher protection level, defenders can defect over 
attackers and abort the vandalism. In fact, there are some exemplary cases that defenders 
effectively ceased the deliberate damage with the right strategy combinations just like 
the cross point in figure 15. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Defender's [u(A,D)] vs. attacker's [U(A,D)] payoff summary. 
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Model Outcome: Sequential Manner (Extensive decision tree) 
 In addition to simultaneous game mode, sequential mode is commonly used in an 
investigation where one player first made a strategy. To explicitly express the scenarios 
and solve the game, the backward induction method [56] is used by analyzing the 
extensive representation which is exhibited in Figure 16.  Let’s assume the government 
or pipeline company starts to play strategy first, and the pairwise of payoffs are listed at 
the bottom of the decision tree in Figure 16. With the application of backward induction, 
it is credible for the latter player, attackers to select AS5 under each of tree branch of DS1, 
DS2, DS3, DS4 and DS5 since the payoff of AS5 has the highest value. With that noted, the 
passive player, defenders at the starting stage would, therefore, prefer to choose DS5 to 
react to attackers’ “future” decision and to minimize his disutility and the consequence 
[55]. The credible sequential route is highlighted in bold shown in Figure 16.  
 
4.2 Game-Theoretic Model Discussion 
 The probability and consequence scale of intentional damage to pipelines are 
difficult to predict and evaluate, largely because of the uncertainty of human psychology, 
making it almost inaccessible via conventional risk assessment tools like fault tree 
analysis. However, the game-theoretic model can clarify the ambiguity by computing 
payoffs, sorting out possible scenarios and applying theory to reach equilibrium and 
provide credible action. Knowing the nature of all the players in the game can forecast 
potential behaviors and thus help us to select the best strategy in different situations.  
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 In the pipeline secure game or other similar infrastructure protection game, 
regardless of budget limitation, attackers or defenders without context are anticipated to 
choose the highest level of strategy to maximize their utility functions expanding (from 
the views of attackers) or diminishing (from the views of defenders) the damage as much 
as possible no matter it’s a simultaneous mode or sequential mode. This imitative 
manner that players are copying the strategy level from their opponent is in agreement 
with the reality. For instance, the way that U.S. Security Advisory System against a 
terrorist attack is to address a similar level of countermeasures to combat the terrorism.  
 This game-theoretic model for intentional damage on pipeline aims to establish a 
framework that considers a number of facets including the nature of pipeline 
infrastructure, attack/protection effectiveness, possible levels of strategies, overall losses 
and gaming philosophy. The payoff values based on assumptions are changeable once 
being applied in a real case. It should be stressed that other essential elements such as 
economic factor will also have an impact on the final strategy decisions. With all the 
information in hand, equilibrium points will be very suggestive in assigning credible 
pathway of the game and people can refer the model basis to take appropriate action.  
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Figure 16. Extensive form of game-theoretic model for intentional third-party damage on pipeline.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
  
 The pipeline third-party interference can be divided into unintentional 
disturbance and malicious sabotage. This failure mode is usually one of the least factors 
being considered during the pipeline hazard assessment stage despite the substantial 
portion contributing to the total number of oil and gas pipeline incident. This is because 
of the intrinsic risk assessment challenge. A probabilistic risk analysis is hard to model 
human actions and cannot be applied to intentional acts. Due to the distinctive 
motivation of third-party damage, an unintentional third-party damage BN model and a 
game-theoretic model were therefore built to examine the mechanism of pipeline failure 
caused by third-party damage.  
 The unintentional third-party damage BN model coupled the methods of relative 
risk scoring and quantitative risk assessment targeting to clarify the cause-effect 
relationship of unintentional third-party damage and quantify the failure probability 
simultaneously under this type of failure mode without loss flexibility. Set of 
assumptions are made for prior probabilities to allow initial computation and analysis of 
the study. Real data once available, can be inserted as observations to obtain more 
practical results that can reveal the risk ranking among pipeline segments and be 
suggestive for future risk mitigation resource allocation.   
 In order to get good insights into adversarial acts to pipeline third-party damage, 
a game-theoretic model is developed by understanding attack ideology, defining risk 
security level, and sorting out possible strategies and scenarios for each party.  
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 In conclusion, this work provides a better understanding in pipeline third-party 
intrusion mechanism and developed two practical risk assessment models for industry to 
perform associated risk analysis based on different motivations.  
 Though third-party damage plays a critical role in pipeline failure modes, 
probabilistic studies on other aspects such as corrosion, equipment failure and incorrect 
operations out of the seven major causes are recommended to be investigated by 
Bayesian Network model in the future. The incorporation of the corresponding models 
can develop a more holistic pipeline failure analysis network for industrial use.    
 In addition to the probabilistic study, risk-based consequence analysis is also 
suggested to be a continuation study with a number of physical modeling being 
integrated (Gaussian plume, Thermal radiation flux model and Overpressure model) to 
compute and estimate the outcome in a pipeline incident, giving rise to fulfill an overall 
risk assessment of pipeline.  
 Another possible future work on this topic can be assigned to use the game-
theoretic model to simulate malicious attacks by pilferage while improving the 
evaluation of countermeasures against terrorism or pilferage since measures that prevent 
a specific event from occurring can simply make terrorists or stealers shift their tactics 
from more resistant targets to more vulnerable ones. The existing model in this work 
hence can be modified to apply to the case of pilferage as well as implement more 
complicated strategies to meet scenarios in a more realistic world.  
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APPENDIX A 
NOTE: SAS (r) Proprietary Software 9.4 (TS1M3) 
      Licensed to TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY - SFA T&R, Site 70080787. 
NOTE: This session is executing on the X64_8PRO  platform. 
 
 
 
NOTE: Updated analytical products: 
 
      SAS/STAT 14.1 
      SAS/ETS 14.1 
      SAS/OR 14.1 
      SAS/IML 14.1 
      SAS/QC 14.1 
 
NOTE: Additional host information: 
 
 X64_8PRO WIN 6.2.9200  Workstation 
 
NOTE: SAS initialization used: 
      real time           2.43 seconds 
      cpu time            1.79 seconds 
 
1    libname model1 'C:\Users\Yan\Documents\my SAS folders\game theory model\payoff.xlsx'; 
NOTE: Libref MODEL1 was successfully assigned as follows: 
      Engine:        EXCEL 
      Physical Name: C:\Users\Yan\Documents\my SAS folders\game theory model\payoff.xlsx 
2    libname cyemotiu 'C:\Users\Yan\Documents\my SAS folders\game theory model'; 
NOTE: Libref CYEMOTIU was successfully assigned as follows: 
      Engine:        V9 
      Physical Name: C:\Users\Yan\Documents\my SAS folders\game theory model 
3 
4    data cyemotiu.sim(drop=i beta_1-beta_4 v1-v4); 
5        set model1.'simultaneous$'n; 
6        array D{4} D1-D4; 
7        array A{4} A1-A4; 
8        array beta{4} beta_1-beta_4; 
9        array prob{4} prob1-prob4; 
10       array v{4} v1-v4; 
11       array ud{4} ud1-ud4; 
12       array ua{4} ua1-ua4; 
13           do i=1 to 4; 
14               prob{i}=A{i}/(A{i}+beta{i}*D{i}); 
15               ud{i}=v{i}*(1-prob{i})-50*D{i}; 
16               ua{i}=v{i}*prob{i}-5*A{i}; 
17           end; 
18       udtotal=sum(ud1,ud2,ud3,ud4); 
19       uatotal=sum(ua1,ua2,ua3,ua4); 
20       label D1='D(i=1)' 
21             D2='D(i=2)' 
22             D3='D(i=3)' 
23             D4='D(i=4)' 
24             A1='A(i=1)' 
25             A2='A(i=2)' 
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26             A3='A(i=3)' 
27             A4='A(i=4)' 
28             udtotal='u(A,D)' 
29             uatotal='U(A,D)'; 
30   run; 
 
NOTE: There were 25 observations read from the data set MODEL1.'simultaneous$'n. 
NOTE: The data set CYEMOTIU.SIM has 25 observations and 23 variables. 
NOTE: DATA statement used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.09 seconds 
      cpu time            0.09 seconds 
 
 
31 
32   ods pdf file='C:\Users\Yan\Documents\my SAS folders\game theory model\gameoutput.pdf'; 
NOTE: Writing ODS PDF output to DISK destination 
      "C:\Users\Yan\Documents\my SAS folders\game theory model\gameoutput.pdf", printer "PDF". 
33   title; 
34   option nodate nonumber; 
35   proc contents data=cyemotiu.sim; 
NOTE: Writing HTML Body file: sashtml.htm 
36   run; 
 
NOTE: PROCEDURE CONTENTS used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.67 seconds 
      cpu time            0.40 seconds 
 
 
37 
38   title 'Possible strategy combinations of defenders vs. attackers based on five defense/attack 
38 ! level'; 
39   proc print data=cyemotiu.sim(keep=strategy D1-D4 A1-A4) label; 
40   run; 
 
NOTE: There were 25 observations read from the data set CYEMOTIU.SIM. 
NOTE: PROCEDURE PRINT used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.24 seconds 
      cpu time            0.09 seconds 
 
 
41 
42   title 'List of probability of pipeline failure due to intentional damage under diffferent 
43   security risk levels given by available strategies (defender vs. attacker)'; 
44   proc print data=cyemotiu.sim(keep=strategy prob1-prob4) label; 
45       label prob1='P(1=1)' 
46             prob2='P(i=2)' 
47             prob3='P(i=3)' 
48             prob4='P(i=4)'; 
49   run; 
 
NOTE: There were 25 observations read from the data set CYEMOTIU.SIM. 
NOTE: PROCEDURE PRINT used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.13 seconds 
      cpu time            0.03 seconds 
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50 
51   title 'List of calculated utility function under diffferent security risk levels 
52   given by available defender vs. attacker strategies'; 
53   proc print data=cyemotiu.sim(drop=prob1-prob4 D1-D4 A1-A4) label; 
54       format udtotal uatotal ua1-ua4 ud1-ud4 6.; 
55       label ud1='u(i=1)' 
56             ud2='u(i=2)' 
57             ud3='u(i=3)' 
58             ud4='u(i=4)' 
59             ua1='U(i=1)' 
60             ua2='U(i=2)' 
61             ua3='U(i=3)' 
62             ua4='U(i=4)'; 
63   run; 
 
NOTE: There were 25 observations read from the data set CYEMOTIU.SIM. 
NOTE: PROCEDURE PRINT used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.28 seconds 
      cpu time            0.12 seconds 
 
 
64   title; 
65   ods pdf close; 
NOTE: ODS PDF printed 5 pages to C:\Users\Yan\Documents\my SAS folders\game theory 
      model\gameoutput.pdf. 
 
